



The Political Economy of Governance in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Deliverable No. 5

Working Package IV: The Political Economy of the EMP's Security and Socio-Cultural
"Pillars"

Summary of findings

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1. Introduction

- In the Barcelona Declaration the Euro-Mediterranean partners expressed their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region represent as a whole a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen using all the means at their disposal. The purpose of Working Package 4 is to understand the structures and processes that influence the security of the Euro-Mediterranean area. Several analysts have noted that the EMP's security and socio-cultural (1st and 3rd) baskets have been sidelined in favour of economic priorities. Working Package 4 tries to address this shortfall and focus on the main elements that must be taken into account in order to create an area of peace and stability. With this purpose in mind the analysis has taken into account three different issues, studied respectively by the Centre for Strategic Studies (University of Jordan, Amman), the University Institute for European Studies (CEU San Pablo University, Madrid) and the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence (Freie Universität Berlin).
- The first issue analysed is the relation between security and culture. This area deals with the cultural determinant of security within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The third basket of the Barcelona Process addresses the subject of culture stating that dialogue between cultures is an essential factor in bringing peoples closer together, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other. Therefore the Euro-Mediterranean partners agreed to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. However, culture has been neglected as a fundamental element in terms of security. It is alleged that the potential strength of the security pillar has been weakened because of cultural differences between European and Arab countries.
- The second element analysed is 'soft security'. It is generally accepted that soft security risks are those of a non-military origin, such as nuclear safety problems, infectious diseases, illegal migration, violation of human rights or transnational organised crime. Hard security has not been recognised as a useful tool to react against these types of risk. Soft security mechanisms are more effective in order to protect citizens' security in certain cases. To address this issue the European Union has set up an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Within this framework it is possible to analyse what scope there is for the development of a more stable society within the Euro-Mediterranean region. The analysis of this area is related to the comparison of the areas of freedom, security and justice within the European Union and the area of peace and stability within the Euro-Mediterranean region. Specifically, the research is centred on the ability of the EMP to cooperate in order to tackle

the soft security issue, posing the following question: How far is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership from becoming an area of peace and stability?

- The third part of the research is focused on ‘hard security’. Hard security encompasses the traditional security issues related to foreign policy and the activity of armed forces. The argument is that the assumption that the EU can export its own security governance model to a region with very different problems is fundamentally flawed. The paper discusses the European role in three ‘hard security’ crises in the MENA region: the long-standing conflict over the status of Western Sahara, the rise of Iran as a traditional regional power, and the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hezbollah and its aftermath. Together these events have illustrated the painful truth that security in the MENA remains threatened by seemingly intractable tensions and frequent wars. It follows that the European Union’s ability to act in crisis situations is more limited than many expect. Nevertheless, the EU has been active at various levels in all three of the crises dealt with this paper, and the outcome of this activity can tell us a lot about the Union’s capabilities and shortcomings as an international security actor.

2. Findings

- **1. The Cultural Component of Security within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Perceptions and Misperceptions (Centre for Strategic Studies)**

- The dialogue on security has been weakened due to perceptual differences, and the solution to re-starting dialogue would be to develop a cross-cultural understanding of security to be incorporated within the structure of the EMP. Any attempt by the EMP to build a region of peace and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean area should include an alternative approach that includes intercultural dialogue to complement the traditional institutions of security. It is important to differentiate between the contradictory perceptions of security, particularly as it relates to Arab society and the Arab state. Thus, an understanding of the culture of security should encompass a thorough analysis of perceptions of security that are shaped by history, power relations, religion, and previous interactions with ‘the other’. From such an analysis, it was found that the political and security concerns of the Arab states are not specifically related to the EU; this is in contrast to the EU states, which conceive their major security threats as stemming from the Southern Mediterranean.

- There is a large perceptual gap on security issues between the different players in the Euro-Med: Arab states, EU states, and civil society. This gap has not been addressed within the EMP, which has tended to highlight the security threats of the EU at the expense of the other partners. Furthermore, the lack of cross-cultural dialogue in both theory and policy has led to a feeling of dissatisfaction among civil society, particularly in the Arab world, who view the Euro-centric structure of the EMP as another form of Western intervention. Similarly, North American unilateralism in the Arab world has alienated and silenced Europe's voice in the region, and has exacerbated Arab suspicions of the West. Finally, some security issues such as immigration have been at the forefront of EMP debate, which has in fact hindered the creation of a Euro-Med identity in the region.
- Furthermore, the underlying problem with EMP security as it relates to Arab security perceptions is that the Partnership fails to go beyond state-defined security. By doing so, they have helped many autocratic regimes in co-opting the term 'security' to mean security from both the democratic forces as well as security from the radical forces within the Arab world. Since these regimes are hardly representative of their people, there are also different perceptions of security from within the Arab world that are being ignored: democratic groups see their security as a protection of their universal human rights and freedom; radical groups may see security as protection from infiltration from the West, while high-level political elites may view security from forces trying to overthrow their regimes. Regardless of their viewpoints, enhancing cross-cultural dialogue is futile unless all parties are invited to the discussion.
- The importance of a dialogue between cultures within the framework of security has been the topic of countless discussions and declarations, particularly after 9/11. The controversy over the Pope's remarks about Islam in September 2006 indicated just how little negotiations have advanced, particularly in the EuroMed context. The EMP project began with auspicious beginnings and common consensus, yet it has failed to develop peace-making practices, increasingly exhibited inconsistencies and dilemmas, and proven unable to provide a framework for the negotiation of a security partnership. If the eventual aim of the EMP is in fact to construct a region of collective peace and security, there is an urgent need to revisit proposals for intercultural dialogue, which in many cases could be considered root causes of security threats.
- In conclusion, it can be said that the Barcelona Process has failed to follow through on its goal for three fundamental cultural reasons: firstly, the EMP approach to security has been

more concerned with short-term developments rather than long-term structural trends (particularly with regards to trade and migration); secondly, the EMP has not properly addressed the lack of trust that exists between both sides that has its history in the legacy of colonialism and the more recent US military interventions in the region; and finally, there are structural impediments to the creation of a EuroMed region, such as the lack of a coherent shared narrative, as well as external identity ties that are contradictory to the idea of a EuroMed region.

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- **2. Soft-Security within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Instituto de Estudios Europeos)**

- The question that the research tries to answer is what tools the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has to act within the soft security aspects. To answer this question an analysis has been made of the instruments of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the light of the elements that such cooperation has in common with the one carried out at European Union sphere, that is guided by the European Security Strategy and the Hague Programme. The rationale behind this is as follows. It is a fact that the EU is currently an area of peace and stability which is on the way to becoming an area of freedom, security and justice. Therefore, the guidelines contained in the European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, and the current state of some elements of the Hague Programme, such as a comprehensive programme for 2005-2009 on strengthening the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice, could be a good reference point in order to gauge whether the Euro- Mediterranean area is on the way to establishing the basis for becoming the area of peace and stability advocated by the Barcelona Declaration.

- The analysis is focused on four common elements of the European Security Strategy, the Hague Programme and the first basket of the Barcelona Declaration:

- **Respect of fundamental rights.** Generally-speaking, the EU and the Mediterranean countries are committed to adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the observance of human rights and democracy. Although it is obvious that there have been some steps forward, there is still a long way to go on this issue. UN standards are not reached in all Mediterranean countries. Notwithstanding, the real problem in many Mediterranean countries is torture and ill-treatment. As regards other fundamental rights, such as equal treatment for men and women, freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association and the role of NGOs, there is a need to work harder. Building an area of “soft security” without

human rights is doomed to failure. This is why reinforced cooperation and mutual understanding between the EU and its Mediterranean counterparts should go on in the near future, not only for their own security, but also for the region as a whole.

- **Fight against terrorism.** The EMP is creating a framework to fight better against terrorism. Certain terrorist attacks against Mediterranean countries have been crucial in awakening and reminding States that the objectives established in 1995 must guide the method of creation of the area of peace and stability pursued by the Barcelona Process.

- In fact, the Moroccan preoccupation with terrorism did not arise until May 2003, when the Casablanca attacks took place. Egypt would not have been seen as an essential partner in any anti-terrorism initiative if certain events had not also directly implicated Egyptian terrorists associated with international networks.

- In any case, the atmosphere of fear created by terrorist attacks is what has promoted the government reaction, not only at an internal level, but also in the relations with other geographical areas. The lack of specific advances in terrorism matters during the period 2000-2006 does not mean that the counter terrorist fight is on stand-by. This timid progress could be viewed as normal given the short period of time since Mediterranean countries reacted, looking at how to face up to the terrorist threat and what instruments to use within the EMP.

- The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism is a first achievement in the fight against terrorist phenomenon, although its clauses are not enough to reach the development of an effective policy. The Code is more a general declaration than an action plan. Therefore its implementation requires a strategy.

- **Fight against organised crime and drug trafficking.** As a general approach we can say that there is neither uniformity nor systematisation on the part of the European Union in its relations with its Mediterranean counterparts in the area of the fight against organised crime. The Association Agreements are a good starting point, but some of them do not include a special reference to organised crime. The Action Plans and Country Reports show the special relevance given to organised crime in recent years, but there is a need for more uniformity.

- **Police and judicial cooperation.** The analysis of police and judicial cooperation shows that this concept has its own defined presence within the European Union, whereas with regards to the EMP it is an embryonic one given that its conceptualization arises with the creation of a fourth basket focused on justice, security, migration and integration affairs.

Euro-Mediterranean police and judicial cooperation is a developing instrument that completes the fight against the risks of soft security analysed in our research: the contravention of human rights, terrorism and organised crime.

- In any event, as part of soft security, police and judicial cooperation between the both sides of the Mediterranean Sea exist, although it is at an early stage. Mutual assistance in this field is beginning to be developed, although the Association Agreements do not have a specific legal basis for carrying it out. This gap could be due to the fact that the term acquired autonomy only in the Amsterdam Treaty, signed after the launching of the Barcelona Process, and because the European police and judicial agencies, Europol and Eurojust, were only operative in 1999 and 2002 respectively, again after the beginning of the Barcelona Process.

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- **3. The European 'Security Community' as an export commodity: EU security policy and crisis resolution in the Middle East and North Africa (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence)**

- Although pure examples of security communities do not exist in the real world, the EU is perhaps the world's most comprehensive example of a security community. A security community is based on the real assurance that members of the community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in another way. For the EU, the language of the security community model is reiterated in the so-called Petersberg Tasks, the December 2003 European Security Strategy and the Barcelona Declaration, which calls upon its signatories to settle their disputes by peaceful means, while supporting processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-regional cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War, this European security community model has not only been extended to Central and Eastern European countries, but also to the Middle East and North Africa. The core reason for the failure of EU efforts to begin building a MENA security community is the disparity of interests between the EU, its member states and its MENA partners. While the European security interests in the Mediterranean are mostly based on 'soft' security concerns – illegal migration, organised crime and people trafficking, environmental degradation and the fear of terrorist attacks in European cities, MENA governments understand national security in more traditional terms.

- Against this background, the paper discusses the European role in three 'hard security' crises in the MENA region: Western Sahara, Iran and Lebanon. The EU has repeatedly called upon all parties to move negotiations forward and has raised the Western Saharan issue during

its Association Council meetings with Morocco. However, any lasting solution will require agreement among the governments of Morocco, Algeria, Spain and France. On the other hand, the EU has been more active in conducting humanitarian activities in Western Sahara. In this respect, the European Parliament issued a resolution on human rights in Western Sahara and ECHO's role has been crucial in maintaining four refugee camps near Tindouf in south-western Algeria.

- Although not formally a member of either the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the European Neighbourhood Policy, Iran is central to the EU's regional security objectives in the MENA. This has become even more apparent in recent years as the international community's concern that Tehran is developing nuclear weapons has grown. The EU has taken a prominent role in diplomatic efforts by the international community to convince Iran to give up its nuclear weapons programme. In this sense, the E3/EU (Britain, France, Germany and the EU) offered Iran a package of economic incentives in exchange for Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and acceptance of inspections by the IAEA. Notwithstanding, despite the best efforts of the EU and High Representative Solana, it appears that diplomatic efforts – carrot and stick diplomacy - may not prevent the Iranian regime from successfully joining the family of nuclear armed states, a situation that would be disastrous for EU-led efforts to build a regional security community.

- The biggest security challenge in the MENA remains the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EU has repeatedly stated that a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is the key to the success of the Barcelona Process, especially in the security arena. However, during the summer of 2006 the Barcelona process seemed a distant dream. Hezbollah guerrillas attacked an Israeli border patrol and abducted two soldiers. Although the EU did not fiddle while Beirut burned, there was little Brussels could do other than issue statements, launch a humanitarian mission and prepare funds for the aftermath. ECHO opened an office in Beirut, EU officials pressed the Israeli government for safe corridors for the access of humanitarian convoys and the EU pledged over €100 million in assistance to the crisis in Lebanon. On the other hand, in the wake of the conflict the EU has reiterated its commitment to the Lebanese government, and has committed to the reconstruction process. In this respect, thirteen EU countries take part in UNIFIL.

- In a nutshell, the prevalence of these three hard security crises in the MENA is indicative of a regional security environment that is different from that envisaged by the security model at the heart of the EU's Mediterranean policy. First of all, because the EU and

MENA countries have very different priorities in the security arena. Secondly, because a security community will not take root while the EU is not taken seriously as an actor by regional powers. And thirdly, because the unanimity rule for international security decisions reduces the likelihood of common action in areas where member states interests diverge.

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3. Policy Recommendations

- **1. Centre for Strategic Studies (Amman, Jordan)**

The creation of a region of peace and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean will only be achieved through an understanding of all security perceptions within the region, and the EMP must use an approach that combines cross-cultural security aspects to provide protection in a more coordinated way. This requires a number of theoretical approaches to security promotion:

- All actors should be involved in the dialogue on security, since it is the individual element of cooperation that becomes a part of the collective effort to secure the overall goal;
- Dialogue on security should take a post-colonial approach that would address the issue of economic, political, and social inequalities, and act upon those issues to make the ‘Partnership’ more of a partnership; and
- The double standards prevalent in immigration policies, education systems, and immigration laws that are prevalent on both sides of the Mediterranean should be eliminated.

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- **2. Instituto de Estudios Europeos (CEU San Pablo University, Madrid)**

- In order to be able to envisage a future Euro-Mediterranean area with less soft security concerns, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will have to give the same treatment to all its states, to establish more specific common goals for the short and medium term as well as the specific economic, legal and/or political instruments to achieve them and to evaluate whether the goals have been reached on the basis of a standardised system, structured and systematized in the same manner. There are specific recommendations regarding four areas related with the construction of an area of peace and stability:

- **Respect for fundamental rights:** 1) Further develop initiatives aiming at promoting democracy and human rights; 2) Use as a benchmark the launching of National Centres and Councils for Human Rights (Egypt, Jordan and Morocco); 3) Inform society in relation to human rights; and 4) Guarantee the respect for an “inner group” of fundamental rights and freedoms.
- **Fight against terrorism:** 1) From a legal perspective, the next two goals in this field should be: a) To achieve a common understanding about terrorist acts and b) To draw up a list of terrorist persons, groups and entities. 2) On a broader view, special attention should be paid to prevention and funding.
- **Fight organised crime:** In order to cope with the problem of an uneven approach, there is a need to set up a common agenda on fighting against this phenomenon. The focus should be given to certain priority areas such as money laundering, drugs trafficking and trafficking of human beings.
- **Police and judicial cooperation:** The key could be the promotion of mutual trust between the authorities of the Euro-Mediterranean countries through the development of common projects.

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- **3. Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence (Free University Berlin, Germany)**

- The three crises discussed illustrate the conundrum facing the EU’s MENA security policy in different ways. In the Western Saharan case, the EU can serve as a forum for debating the issues and can offer advice and humanitarian assistance, but any final agreement must be reached by the governments of Spain, France, Morocco and Algeria. The key to containing Iranian ambitions is through achieving a stable balance of power in the broader Middle East. This means that the West needs to treat Iran’s situation seriously. And the Lebanon case demonstrates both the strengths and the weaknesses of the EU as a security actor in the MENA. However, the EU certainly has the ability to add value to international discourse on regional security in the MENA. Firstly, by appealing to others to respect principles of non-violence and secondly by abandoning the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability in favour of a draft framework that includes regional powers currently outside the Barcelona Process, such as the United States, Iran, Libya, Russia and China.

Working Package Workshop Overview

- **Warsaw, June 2006**

- A first contact among the research teams took place at the premises of the Warsaw School of Economics at a time when the workshops of the other working packages were taking place. Under the coordination of the University Institute for European Studies, the group set up a schema of the different issues to be analysed within the working package. All the teams were free to develop the research in their areas of interest. Three topics were raised: soft security, hard security and culture. The structure was briefly presented to the other research teams, receiving interesting comments and opinions in order to focus the attention on the most important issues.

- **Orleans, September 2007**

- Before the Orleans workshop the research teams exchanged preliminary drafts of the corresponding working papers. Therefore the Orleans workshop was used to exchange comments with the other members of the working package and of the whole Go-EuroMed project. The topics were refined. The issue of coherence was taken as a main concern. The three research issues were linked to form a coherent structure. Afterwards some contacts through the Go-EuroMed chat room took place. There were some final discussions among the three research teams with the objective of drafting the summary of findings.